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Wide Awake or Half-Asleep? Revelations
from Jurisprudential Tailings Found in
Rosenberger v. University of Virginia
ROBERT L. WARJNG*

In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,'
the United States Supreme Court ordered the University to provide funding
for Wide Awake Productions ("WAP") which publishes a student Christian
evangelical magazine. Rosenberger has sparked debate as to -whether it
signalled "the demise of the funding prohibition in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence."' What is now beyond debate, however, is that Rosenberger
has had a substantial, positive impact on the jurisprudence affecting funded
forums for student speech at public universities.3 In addition, this case has
a potential impact on the constitutionality of public universities' use of
compulsory student activity fees to fund forums of diverse student speech.4
At the end of this Article, I make a prediction that, as a result of boldly
pushing the boundaries of the Establishment Clause where no Supreme
Court has gone before, the RosenbergerCourt has made it more likely that
future courts will find mandatory student activity fees to be unconstitutional.
I do not take a direct path to my conclusion, as is often the case with an
explorer whose purpose is to experience the view from the top of the
mountain. As part of my journey, I examine the Court's treatment of
several issues important to the vitality of the First Amendment. I conclude
that Rosenberger offers very little to the -general body of free speech
jurisprudence beyond the narrow facts of this case. Thus, -Rosenberger
affords no broad views of the First Amendment landscape. This seems
disappointing because our system of law has conditioned us to expect that
our Supreme Court will use an individual case as a vehicle to declare
principles of law that will encompass a broader range of situations.' All
* A.B., Princeton University; J.D., University of San Francisco School of Law. I
would like to thank George Otstott, Mark Woodward, and my father, Dabney Waring, for

their invaluable editing work. I would also like to thank my First Amendment mentor,
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John Denvir, for his ongoing guidance and encouragement.
115 S.Ct. 2510 (1995).
Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2528 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
See infra part IV.
See infra part V.
Indeed, precedent is an essential part of our legal system. For example, in her
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Rosenbergermay have accomplished, as Justice Souter said in dissent, was
to make "a shambles out of student activity fees in public colleges. '"
As Souter did in Rosenberger, it is common for the Court's dissenters
to complain that the majority has misapplied one or more rules of law.
However, Rosenbergerillustrates the futility of such criticism. Rosenberger
and other recent Supreme Court First Amendment cases demonstrate that
there is very little consistency in how key free speech precepts are applied.7
What the rules are and how they are to be utilized in a particular case is
largely a heuristic exercise dependent on the political and social
predilections of the individual author of an opinion. Each "adventure in a
doctrinal wonderland"' appears restricted only by the influence of those
Justices whose votes are necessary to form a majority. Rosenberger
prompted Justice O'Connor to complain that the Court placed too much
emphasis on "categorical platitudes" and not enough on "the hard task of
judging
sifting through the details ... [of] the particular facts of each
9
case."
Writing for the majority in Rosenberger,Justice Kennedy applied two
First Amendment concepts - content discrimination' ° and limited public
forum" - about which he previously had disagreed with other members
of the Court. Kennedy redefined these concepts by merging them with
related concepts: content discrimination emerged in the image of viewpoint
discrimination and the limited public forum took on the form of the
nonpublic forum. As for a third concept, strict scrutiny, 2 his avoidance
of the term established its irrelevance.
The first part of this Article begins with a history of the case, followed
by a brief discussion of two factors that contribute to the jurisprudential
weakness of the free speech rulings in Rosenberger: the closeness of the
vote and the focus on the Establishment Clause. Part II is an admittedly

concurrence in Rosenberger, Justice O'Connor expressed concern over the absence of clear
precedent for the Court's holding. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2525 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
6. Rosenberger, 115

S. Ct. at 2551 (Souter, J., dissenting).
7. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996) (unanimous
decision; no majority opinion) (commercial speech); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.

377, 398 (1992) (White, J., concurring in judgment) ("[T]he majority casts aside long-

established First Amendment doctrine without the benefit of briefing and adopts an untried
theory.").

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 418 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).

Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2525-26 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
See infra part II.B.3.
See infra part II.D.
See infra part II.C.
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eccentric analysis of the case, examining the Court's references to the
philosopher Descartes, the distinction between content and viewpoint
discrimination, strict scrutiny, limited public forums, and the collision of
"bedrock" principles. Part Im reviews a few of the recent First Amendment
cases in the circuit courts that have relied on Rosenberger. Part IV
discusses the policy reversal wrought by Rosenbergerat the University of
California, which recently had decided not to fund ideological student
groups.' 3 Part V reviews several rulings of the Rosenberger Court that
could affect litigation challenging the use of mandatory student activity fees
to fund forums for student speech at public universities, and makes a
prediction as to how this issue may finally be resolved.
I. BACKGROUND
A. CASE HISTORY

The case began when the University of Virginia, a public university,
denied funding to WAP, which published a student Christian magazine. 4
WAP had sought subsidization of its printing costs from the University's
Student Activities Fund ("SAF"). 5 The SAF received "its money from a
mandatory fee of $14 per semester assessed to each full-time student."' 6
University regulations barred SAF funding for any student religious group,
defined as an organization that "primarily promotes or manifests a particular
17
belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.'
WAP and three of its members sued the University in Federal District
Court, alleging violation of their rights to freedom of speech and press, free
exercise of religion, and equal protection of the law under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.18 The district court granted summary judgment to the University,
and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 9
13. The University based its pre-Rosenberger policy on a recent ruling by the
California Supreme Court. Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500 (Cal.), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 863 (1993).
14. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2515. The Court variously refers to the publication as

a magazine and as a newspaper. WAP's stated goals for the magazine were "to challenge
Christians to live, in word and deed, according to the faith they proclaim and to encourage
students to consider what a personal relationship with Jesus Christ means." Id. (citation and
quotation marks omitted).
15. Id.

16. Id. at 2514.
17. Id. at 2515 (citation omitted) (alteration in original).
18. Id. at 2516.
19. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, 795 F. Supp. 175
(W.D. Va. 1992) (mem.), aftd, 18 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
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B. EXCUSES, EXCUSES

Justice Kennedy's majority opinion garnered four unrestricted votes in
2
Supplying the fifth vote, Justice O'Connor agreed with
Rosenberger.
some of Kennedy's reasoning, but rejected his use of sweeping, doctrinal
conclusions.2 She made it clear that in her view, the holding was limited
to the "particular facts" of this case. 2 The four dissenters all gathered
under the tent erected by Justice Souter. One could characterize the lack of
broader jurisprudential value in the Court's free speech rulings as merely a
product of Justice O'Connor's moderation of the majority's rationale. But
even without O'Connor's efforts, Kennedy's rationale was weakened by
hyperbole, omissions and redefinitions of key First Amendment concepts.
The RosenbergerCourt's focus on the Establishment Clause also helped
23
diminish the value and importance of its free speech jurisprudence. The
fight over church and state issues drove Kennedy to adopt rules on free
speech that were more extreme than necessary merely to resolve this case
in favor of petitioner,2 which in turn pushed Justice Souter to take free
speech positions that appear at odds with those he has previously supported.25 Or, as Justice Stevens observed in R.A. V.v. City of St. Paul, "the
allure of absolute principles has skewed the analysis. 26
The court of appeals began its analysis by stating that "[t]he Speech and Press Clause cannot
be metamorphosed into a promise that the federal government will purchase a bullhorn,
paper, and ink for the convenience of every garrulous member of the American populace."
Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 277.
20. Justice Thomas concurred separately, stating that although he agreed fully with
majority opinion, he wanted to offer an historical analysis of the Establishment Clause
opposed to that offered by the dissent. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2528 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
21. See infra part II.E.
concurring) ("The nature of the
22. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2526 (O'Connor, J.,
dispute does not admit of categorical answers, nor should any be inferred from the Court's
decision today ...."); see id. at 2525-28.
23. As compared to free speech issues, the dissent devoted considerably more ink to
the Establishment Clause, and Justice Thomas dedicated his entire concurrence to it.
Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2528-33 (Thomas, J., dissenting). By contrast, Kennedy's majority opinion contained more words discussing free speech than the Establishment Clause,
and he chose to discuss free speech as the first issue in the case. Kennedy may have been
influenced by the fact the Respondent, the University of Virginia, did not assert an Establishment Clause defense in its brief before the Supreme Court. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at
2520-21.
24. See infra parts II.B.3, II.D.
25. See infrapart II.B.3. As Justice Blackmun complained, concurring in thejudgment
in R.A. V., "the Court manipulated doctrine to strike down an ordinance whose premise it
opposed." R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 415 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
26. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 417 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
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Regardless of the effect of the Establishment Clause on free speech
precepts, however, Justice Souter correctly observed that the Rosenberger
Court's "speech analysis may have [future] independent application, and its
'
flaws should not pass unremarked."27
II. DETAILS, DETAILS

When examining an appellate opinion with an eye towards writing
something about it, I invariably begin by looking for details that seem out
of place. There is merit in exploring what initially appear to be jurisprudential tailings.2" At the scene of a crime, detectives are trained to look for
minute details that are the by-products of nefarious activity. Physicians are
also trained to pursue subtle symptoms in their patients. As the old adage
goes, "If you find a thread, follow it." In my search for details in
Rosenberger, several strange threads appeared, which I followed.
A. KENNEDY'S MIND WALK WITH DESCARTES

In the kind of overstatement that permeated portions of his opinion,
Justice Kennedy worried that, "Were the [University's] prohibition applied
with much vigor at all, it would bar funding of essays by hypothetical
student contributors named Plato, Spinoza, and Descartes."2' 9 The United
States Supreme Court has cited Plato previously,3" but Spinoza and
Descartes were a surprise and I wondered if they heretofore had managed
to stay out of the limelight afforded by the Court's nine authors.
Spinoza has made only two previous appearances in the Court's history,
both in the tumultuous 1960s." In Rosenberger, Justice Kennedy made
27. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2547 (Souter, J., dissenting); see infra part II.E.
28. Perhaps I am guilty of Cartesian analysis: using answers to sub-questions to reach
a conclusion about the larger question at issue. See infra part II.A.
29. Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2520.
30. Search of Westlaw, SCT Database (April 9, 1997).
31. Search of Westlaw, SCT Database (April 9, 1997).
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), overturned the conviction for failure
to report for military induction of a draftee claiming conscientious objector status. At issue

was a statutory requirement that a conscientious objector's views be "based upon a 'belief
in a relation to a Supreme Being."' Id. at 167. The defendant had "cited such personages
as Plato, Aristotle and Spinoza for support of his ethical belief in intellectual and moral
integrity 'without belief in God, except in the remotest sense."' Id. at 166.
In Scales v. UnitedStates, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), the Court upheld the McCarthy-era
conviction under the Smith Act of a member of the Communist party. Four Justices wrote
separate dissenting opinions. Justice Douglas used the occasion to become the first and only
member of the Court to quote Spinoza. The passage Douglas quoted is worth repeating:
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history by becoming the first Justice to cite Rene Descartes.32 This reference, albeit without the thunder and lightning of a quotation, apparently came
without any prompting by the parties or friends of the court in this case.33
' is familiar to
Although Descartes' axiom, "I think, therefore I am,"34
many, his name is not exactly a household word. Curiously, however,
Descartes was the main topic of discussion in a recent movie that stopped
briefly at art cinemas in some major cities before being released on video.
Mindwal 5 is really more of a play than a film. Staged at Mont St.
Michelle, this drama contains very little plot or action; it is entirely about the
conversation between three characters who discuss the state of modem
political dialogue, with an emphasis on conditions in the United States. The
ideas with which they wrestle come from a book by Fritjof Capra called The
TurningPoint. The vaguely Zen quality of the film, in part due to the musical score by Phillip Glass, is perhaps more easily understood by those
familiar with Capra's 1975 work, The Tao of Physics.
In Mindwalk, Liv Ullmann plays a physicist - somewhat of a recluse
- who believes the world is in grave danger because of the overuse of the
scientific method of discovery and problem solving that originated with Descartes. As she explains to the film's other two characters, one of whom is a
former United States presidential candidate, Descartes promoted the solving
of large problems by breaking them up into smaller and more readily solvable
questions, and then reassembling these solutions into the whole. She holds

Spinoza summed up in a sentence much of the history of the struggle of
man to think and speak what he believes:

Laws which decree what every one must believe, and forbid utterance

against this or that opinion, have too often been enacted to confirm or
enlarge the power of those who dared not suffer free inquiry to be
made, and have by a perversion of authority turned the superstition of
the mob into violence against opponents.
Scales, 367 U.S. 203 at 266 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting SPINOZA, TRACTATUS
THEOLOGICO-POLITICUS 349 (London 1862)).

32. No prior United States Supreme Court decisions contain references to Rene
Descartes. Search of Westlaw, SCT Database (April 9, 1997).
33. There were no references to Descartes in any documents submitted to the Court in
Rosenberger, nor in oral argument before the Court. Search of 1994 WL 704081
(Petitioner's Brief), 1995 WL 16452 (Respondent's Brief), 1995 WL 65465 (Reply Brief),
1995 WL 117631 (U.S. Oral Argument) (April 9, 1997) (Locate search for the word
"Descartes").
34. RENE DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 101 (George Heffernan

ed. & trans., 1990) (1641); see also THE MOODY BLUES, In the Beginning, on IN SEARCH
OF THE LOST CHORD (Decca Records 1968) ("I think. I think I am. Therefore, I am-I
think.").
35. (Paramount 1990).

1997]

REVELATIONS FROM ROSENBERGER

no animosity towards Descartes, but she asserts that Descartes' ideas known as Cartesian thinking - have caused modem scientists and politicians to view global problems in a piecemeal fashion that is dangerously
ineffective.36 For what it's worth, Mindwalk appears to contradict Justice
Kennedy's implied assertion that our society would be better off if more
public financing were used to further spread Descartes' ideas."
Liv Ullmann, speaking for Fritjof Capra, unknowingly sheds light on
the mechanics behind some Supreme Court opinions. The lore of the Court
is that its decision-making employs a pseudo-scientific process akin to
Cartesian analysis.3" The Court's holding in a case is supposed to be
determined by applying different tests to multiple issues that frame the
dispute. As Mindwalk argues, however, conclusions reached by combining
the results of separate tests may fail to address larger and more important
questions.39 There is evidence that members of the Court attempt to
compensate for the shortcomings of this "scientific" decision-making process
by employing, sub rosa, a kind of reverse-Cartesian analysis. The Court's
reasoning all too often suggests that the Court has first answered the larger
question of how it should rule, and then, in perverse and unacknowledged
homage to Descartes, deconstructed its answer into smaller questions.
Contrived solutions to the smaller questions are thus forced by the larger
desired result, with tests selected and applied in an outcome-determinative
fashion that is understandable only in the context of that particular holding.
B.

MOSLEY AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SPEECH CONTENT AND
VIEWPOINT

In order to reach his conclusion in Rosenberger, Kennedy put his own
spin on an essential First Amendment concept: content discrimination.
However, this spin does not - to borrow a phrase from physics - have
much rotational inertia.
1. My Suspicions
The Rosenberger Court began its analysis by stating that "the
government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the
36. Others havejumped on the Cartesian-bashingbandwagon. See e.g., JAMES BAILEY,
AFTER THOUGHT, THE COMPUTER CHALLENGE TO HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 60-68 (1996)
(blaming Descartes for the mistaken notion that human thought is sequential).
37. See Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2520.

38. The fact that prior to Rosenberger, no Supreme Court opinion made reference to
Descartes thus seems all the more remarkable. Maybe no Justice was eager to invite
comparisons of jurisprudential and Cartesian analysis.
39. See infra notes 179-181 and accompanying text.
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message it conveys."4' The sole citation for this sentence was a twentythree-year-old case authored by Justice Marshall, Police Department v.
Mosley.4 This opening was not entirely unexpected; Justice Kennedy first
forcefully articulated his views on the primacy of content in free speech
analysis in his concurrence in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the
New York State Crime Victims Board.42 In rejecting the use of strict scrutiny as a standard for assessing regulations based on the content of speech,
he said, "the sole question is, or ought to be, whether the restriction is in
fact content based."4' 3
This opening citation arouses a skeptical curiosity about Kennedy's
analysis in Rosenberger. The Supreme Court cited Mosley in sixty-one
cases prior to Rosenberger, yet no previous opinion's analysis has begun,
at least not in the first sentence, with a citation to Mosley." Apparently,
Justice Kennedy attached a unique importance to Mosley.
Looking at other cases that had cited Mosley, I came across Widmar v.
Vincent"5 and remembered that it was responsible for my first encounter
with Mosley. Widmar, which was mentioned more than twenty-five times
in Rosenberger, held that a public university that makes its facilities
generally available to student groups creates a limited public forum to which
student religious groups must have rights of access.46 Although Rosenberger
ruled that the Student Activity Fund at the University of Virginia was a limited public forum,47 Rosenberger did not mention one of the more
frequently cited passages from Widmar: "This Court has recognized that the
campus of a public university, at least for its students, possesses many of the
characteristics of a public forum." ' Widmar supported this assertion with

40. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2516.
41. 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
42. 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (holding that "Son of Sam" statute, which required that
income from criminal's book and movie deals be given to his or her victims, violated First
Amendment).
43. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 125 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); see
infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text; see also infra part II.C (discussing strict scrutiny).
Instead, Justice Kennedy would have based his analysis on the rule that "above all else, the
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 126
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95) (quotation marks omitted).
44. Search of Westlaw, SCT Database (April 9, 1997).
45. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). Coincidentally, Widmar was authored by none other than
Justice Lewis Powell, whose seat Kennedy now occupies.
46. Id. at 265-68. For a definition of the limited public forum, see infra part II.D.
47. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2516-17; see infra part II.D.
48. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 n.5.
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a "see generally" citation to only two cases: Mosley and Cox v. Louisiana.49 When I first read this as a law student, I had expected to find that
these cited cases involved public universities. Surprisingly, neither case
explicitly recognized any legal principle regarding universities.
Mosley overturned a state law that prohibited picketing on public
property within 150 feet of a primary or secondary school.5" The opinion
made no mention of the words "university" or "college," nor any issues
affecting higher education institutions. Cox involved a desegregation rally
that began at a university, but the arrest at issue occurred much later and
was solely the result of the defendant's conduct on a public street in front
of a courthouse." Cox did not imply that any of the issues it discussed
affected conduct at universities. Thus, neither case supported the Widmar
Court's assertion that precedent had established the near-public-forum status
of public university campuses. For me, Kennedy's first reference to Mosley
in Rosenberger raised a red flag.
2. Justice Stevens' Suspicions
Justice Stevens, who voted with the dissent in Rosenberger, has had
long-standing misgivings about Mosley and its progeny. In 1980, he opened
a concurrence by saying:
Any student of history who has been reprimanded for
talking about the World Series during a class discussion
of the First Amendment knows that it is incorrect to state
that a "time, place, or manner restriction may not be
based upon either the content or subject matter of
speech."52 And every lawyer who has read our Rules, or
our cases upholding various restrictions on speech with
specific reference to subject matter must recognize the
hyperbole in the dictum [from Mosley]: "But, above all
else, the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content."5

49. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
50. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 92-93.
51. Cox, 379 U.S. at 538-44.
52. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 544-45 (1980)
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting id. at 536 (plurality opinion) (plurality holding
that the state may not prohibit a utility from using bill inserts to discuss "political matters")).
53. Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95).
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More recently, in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul,54 Stevens reiterated this view:
Although the Court has, on occasion, declared that
content-based regulations of speech are "never permitted,"55 such claims are overstated. Indeed, in Mosley
itself, the Court indicated that Chicago's selective proscription of nonlabor picketing was not per se unconstitutional, but rather could be upheld if the City demonstrated
that nonlabor picketing was "clearly more disruptive than
'
Contrary to the broad dicta in
[labor] picketing."56
our decisions demonstrate that
elsewhere,
Mosley and
content-based distinctions, far from being presumptively
invalid, are an inevitable and indispensable aspect of a
coherent understanding of the First Amendment.57
Justice Stevens is not alone; other commentators have voiced similar
criticisms of Mosley.5" There is a possibility that Justice Kennedy's
citation of Mosley in Rosenberger was mere hyperbole.
3. High Court Hyperbole
After his emphatic introduction asserting that no government control of
the content of speech is permitted,59 Kennedy conceded that content may
indeed be regulated in certain instances depending upon the public forum
classification of the property.6 ° Pointing out that expression of viewpoint
may not be so regulated, he then defined viewpoint discrimination to include
certain distinctions initially based on content.6' In this circuitous fashion
Kennedy's views on content supremacy won the day, although more battles
undoubtedly lie ahead.
In Rosenberger, Kennedy labeled viewpoint discrimination as a
"subset" of content discrimination and observed that the distinction between

54. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
55. Id. at 420. (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Mosley,408 U.S. at 99).
56. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mosley, 408 U.S. at 100).
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan III, The FirstAmendment and Content Discrimination,
68 VA. L. REV. 203 (1982).
59. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2516.
60. Id. at 2517; see infra part II.D. This brings to mind Justice O'Connor's recitation
of the story of Julia, who "whispering 'I will ne'er consent,'-consented." Rosenberger,115
S. Ct. at 2526 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quotation marks omitted); see infra text accompanying note 170.
61. Id.
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content and viewpoint "is not a precise one. 6 2 Citing R.A. V., Kennedy
characterized the difference as one of degree. "When the government
targets not subject matter but particular views taken by speakers on a
subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.
Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination."6' 3 Kennedy then explained that the University of Virginia's refusal
to fund a Christian magazine was viewpoint discrimination because the
decision was based on the magazine's injection of religion into political and
social issues. 4
By the very terms of the SAF [Student Activities
Fund] prohibition, the University does not exclude
religion as a subject matter but selects for disfavored
treatment those student journalistic efforts with religious
editorial viewpoints. Religion may be a vast area of
inquiry, but it also provides, as it did here, a specific
premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which a variety
of subjects may be discussed and considered. The
prohibited perspective, not the general subject matter,
resulted in the refusal to make third-party payments, for
the subjects discussed were otherwise within the approved
category of publications.65
In this passage, Kennedy came very close to the argument that it was
the evangelical character of the magazine that enabled the Court to
characterize the University's actions as viewpoint discrimination. He could
have asserted that religious organizations that limited their speech to internal
discussions of theology were not denied funding, whereas the petitioner,
WAP, was singled out because it was solicitingfor converts. It would have
been impossible for Kennedy to argue this point explicitly, however,
because he and Souter had staked out very different characterizations of the
petitioner's magazine - which were at the heart of their positions as to
whether funding would violate the Establishment Clause. Kennedy viewed
WAP as "a student journal, 6 6 a "magazine of philosophical and religious

62. Id. But see R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 431 n.7 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)
("Although the Court has sometimes suggested that subject-matter based and viewpoint-based
regulations are equally problematic, [see, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.62.12
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980)] our decisions belie such claims.").
63. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2516 (citing R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 391).
64. Id.

65. Id. at 2517-18.
66. Id. at 2522.
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expression." 7 Souter, however, saw WAP as an unmistakable vehicle for
proselytizing: "The subject [of WAP] is not the discourse of the scholar's
study or the seminar room, but of the evangelist's mission station and the
pulpit. It is nothing other than the preaching of the word, which ...is
categorically forbidden under the Establishment Clause .... 68
In an attempt to counter the dissent's argument
that the funding
regulation was only content and not viewpoint discrimination, 69 and
perhaps divert the issue away from the debate regarding WAP's evangelism,
Kennedy reached for a blunderbuss - an expansive view of viewpoint
discrimination. He asserted that any attempt to exclude funding of all
religious speech would be viewpoint discrimination.7 ° Following the spirit
of Mosley, and relying on the recent case of Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free School District,7 Kennedy asserted, "The dissent's
declaration that debate is not skewed so long as multiple voices are silenced
is simply wrong; the debate is skewed in multiple ways. "72
Justice Souter responded by saying that "the Court has all but
eviscerated the line between viewpoint and content .... [The] holding
amounts to a significant reformulation of our viewpoint discrimination
precedents."73 As tempting as it is to use Souter's assessment of the
Court's expanded definition of viewpoint discrimination 74 as a predictor of
future court rulings, caution is in order. In light of the five-to-four decision
in Rosenberger,the distinction between content and viewpoint should prove

67. Id. at 2515. Kennedy relied heavily on the University's determination that WAP
was not a "religious organization," which according to University guidelines was "an
organization whose purpose [was] to practiceadevotion to an acknowledged ultimate reality

or deity." Id. (emphasis added).

68. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2535 (Souter, J., dissenting). For example, Souter noted
that "[e]ach issue of Wide Awake contained in the record ... echoes the Apostle's call to
accept salvation." Id. at 2534.

69. Id. at 2550. This distinction was important because of Kennedy's reformulation

of limited public forum rules. See infra part II.D.
70. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2518.
71. 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (White, J.) (invalidating public school rule denying access to

auditorium by religious groups).
72. Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2518.

73. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2550-51 (Souter, J., dissenting). Souter distinguished

the regulation at issue in Rosenberger from that in Lamb's Chapel. Id. at 2550 (citing
Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 387).
74. I have previously advocated just such an expanded approach to viewpoint

discrimination. Robert L. Waring, Comment, Talk is not Cheap: Funded Student Speech at
Public Universitieson Trial,29 U.S.F. L. REv. 541, 619-21 (1995).
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to be a wall of Jello for some time to come. 75 In the future, various

majority coalitions of Justices may expand or contract the concept of
viewpoint discrimination to suit the facts of individual cases. Souter himself
has previously endorsed an expanded analysis of viewpoint discrimination
which appeared to merge with content discrimination and was contrary to
the view he espoused in Rosenberger. Three years ago in R.A. V v. City of
St. Paul76 , Souter voted with Kennedy in unqualified support of Justice
Scalia's majority opinion - which held that an ordinance banning hate
speech was both content and viewpoint discrimination."
C. STRICT SCRUTINY

In a recent California Supreme Court opinion concerning a free speech
challenge to the use of public university student activity fees, Smith v.
Regents of the University of California," the majority and dissenting
opinions disagreed over the applicable standard of scrutiny. 79 Having
previously published a Comment which analyzed this dispute,"0 I was
especially interested in the standard of scrutiny the Rosenberger Court
employed in its free speech analysis. Although the lower court had applied
strict scrutiny,"' the Rosenberger majority never mentioned a standard of
scrutiny," thus futher contributing to the confusion surrounding free

75. The majority used food to illustrate the free speech rights at risk in the case, arguing that if Plato were alive today and petitioned the University of Virginia for funding
support for publication, he would not likely be successful unless he wrote about some nonphilosophical subject such as "making pasta or peanut butter cookies." Rosenberger,115 S.
Ct. at 2520. The dissent continued the food fight by asserting that a university would not be
guilty of viewpoint discrimination if it chose "to fund no speech beyond the subjects of pasta
and cookie preparation." Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2550 (Souter, J., dissenting).
76. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
77. Id. at 391. Cf. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 434 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)
("Contrary to the suggestion of the majority, the St. Paul ordinance does not regulate expression based on viewpoint.").
78. 844 P.2d 500 (Cal.) (requiring public university to provide dissenting students with
"opt out" from mandatory student activity fee), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 863 (1993).
79. Compare Smith, 844 P.2d at 507-10 (strict scrutiny) with Smith, 844 P.2d at 523
& n.3 (Arabian, J., dissenting) ("middle-tier" scrutiny).
80. Waring, supra note 74, at 596-97, 601-02, 606-14.
81. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 18 F.3d 269, 281
(4th Cir. 1994) (citing Arkansas Writers' Project Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987)
(striking down state sales tax exemption for magazines based on their content); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981), discussed supra text accompanying notes 45-48), rev'd,
115 S.Ct. 2510.
82. The Rosenberger dissent asserted that the majority's analysis employed
"Establishment Clause scrutiny." Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2534 (Souter, J., dissenting).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

speech jurisprudence. Possibly, the Court assumed lower courts would recognize that categorizing the ban on funding WAP as viewpoint discrimination triggered a per se standard. 3 It is also possible that Rosenberger
constitutes a rejection of strict scrutiny as a standard in free speech cases.
As discussed below, Kennedy's prior statements regarding strict scrutiny
make it difficult to conclude what his intentions were in Rosenberger.
A decade ago, it appeared that strict scrutiny was an analytical tool
automatically applied in free speech cases, certain to be imposed on the
government where content or viewpoint discrimination was alleged. 4 Justice Brennan was the "intellectual progenitor" of the use of "heightened
scrutiny formulas to achieve liberal policy results." 5 Brennan's waning
influence in the early years of the Rehnquist Court was evidenced by the
ability of conservative members of the Court to occasionally produce
majority opinions calling strict scrutiny into question. 6 This process
83. Justice Kennedy observed that "viewpoint discrimination ...is presumed

impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within [a limited public] forum's
limitations." Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2517 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)). "[T]he government may not regulate speech
based on its substantive content or the message it conveys." 1d. at 2516 (citing Police Dep't
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)).

84. See Richard A. Brisbin, Jr. & Edward V. Heck, The Battle Over Strict Scrutiny:
CoalitionalConflictin the Rehnquist Court,32 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1049, 1049-54 (1992);
Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinctionin FirstAmendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV.

113 (1981).
Free speech strict scrutiny has three elements. "First, the state must show a compelling interest in the regulation. Second, the manner in which the ... regulation restricts
free speech must be narrowly tailored to accomplish its compelling interest. Third, there
must be no less restrictive, alternative means of furthering the interest advanced by.the...

regulation in question." Elizabeth B. Coffin, Note, Content-basedRegulationson Speech:
A Comparisonof the CategorizationandBalancingApproaches to JudicialScrutiny--Simon

& Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Board, 18 U. DAYTON L. REv. 593, 613
(1993) (footnotes omitted); see also Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 362-63 (1976) (holding
that sheriff's department employees could not be compelled to support a political party as a
condition of continued employment).
85. Brisbin & Heck, supra note 84, at 1049-50. Justice Thurgood Marshall also made
significant contributions to strict scrutiny jurisprudence. Id. at 1051-54.
86. Id. at passim. One early case which doubted the supremacy of strict scrutiny as
a First Amendment standard was Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund,
Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985). The NAACP alleged that viewpoint discrimination by the
government had prevented political advocacy groups from gaining access to a federal
employees charity drive. Id. at 812-13. The Court failed to reach the "as applied" claim of
viewpoint discrimination alleged by the NAACP and remanded the case for further findings
on that issue. Id. Writing for a four-Justice majority of a seven-member Court, Justice
O'Connor stated that "there is no requirement that regulations limiting access to a nonpublic
forum must be precisely tailored." Id. at 812. Justices Marshall and Powell recused
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accelerated after Brennan's departure87 and it is possible that Rosenberger
marked a significant step towards the Court's abandonment of the strict
scrutiny standard.
Justice Kennedy's hot and cold relationship with First Amendment
strict scrutiny over just a four-year period may provide some insight into
why he failed to mention it in Rosenberger. Dissenting in the 1990 case
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,8 Kennedy agreed with the
majority that strict scrutiny was the proper standard to apply in that case. 9
However, Kennedy attacked the majority for concluding that the state
regulation at issue satisfied a "compelling interest" and was "narrowly
tailored." 90 Justices Scalia and O'Connor joined Kennedy's dissent. 9' As
one pair of commentators observed soon afterwards, "the spectacle of three
Reagan appointees attacking Brennan and Marshall for lack of vigor in
enforcing First Amendment rights surely supports the conclusion that there
is little debate within the Rehnquist Court about the general principle of
applying strict scrutiny where political speech is concerned."9' 2
Kennedy belied this conclusion in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members
of the New York State Crime Victims Board.93 Parting company with
O'Connor's majority opinion, Kennedy's concurrence stated that application
of the strict scrutiny standard is both "unnecessary and incorrect" where
government regulations on speech are content-based.94 He argued for a'per
themselves. Id. at 813. Corneliuswasultimately resolved on remand as Planned Parenthood
of Metropolitan Washington, D.C., Inc., v. Homer, 694 F. Supp. 970 (1986). Using a
statutory analysis, the district court issued an injunction granting the political advocacy
groups' access to the nonpublic forum. Id. at 973.
87. For example, in R.A. V., Justice White accused the majority of treating "strict scrutiny analysis as irrelevant to the constitutionality of the legislation." R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 403 (1992) (White, J. concurring in judgment). Earlier, Justice Stevens
accused a plurality of applying "exacting scrutiny" that was "neither exacting nor scrutiny."
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 226 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quotation marks
omitted).
88. 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (Marshall, J.) (upholding state law prohibiting use of
corporate treasury funds for political purposes, as applied to Chamber of Commerce which
had significant business purpose and politically-neutral activity).
89. Austin, 494 U.S. at 702-03 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 701.
91. Id. at 695.
92. Brisbin & Heck, supra note 84, at 1062.
93. 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (holding that the "Son of Sam" statute, which required that
income from criminal's book and movie deals be given to his or her victims, violated the
First Amendment).
94. Simon & Schuster,502 U.S. at 124 (Kennedy, J. concurring in judgment). According to Kennedy, strict scrutiny was adopted "in First Amendment cases by accident rather
than as the result of a considered judgment." Id. at 125. He argued that Perryapplied strict
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One of those

exceptions was where the goal of a speech restriction was the protection of
another constitutional right.96 Concurring in Burson v. Freeman,97 Kennedy reiterated the admonition against strict scrutiny he had stated in Simon
& Schuster.98 However, in an accommodation to the strict scrutiny analysis applied by the plurality, he conceded that strict scrutiny might be appro-

priate where the state seeks an exception to content neutrality in order to
protect another constitutional right.99 Kennedy noted that "the compellinginterest test may be one analytical device to detect, in an objective way,
whether the [constitutional right] asserted ... is in fact an accurate description of the purpose and effect of the [speech restriction].' ' 0
In Turner Broadcasting Systems v. FCC,'' Kennedy, this time
writing for a plurality in a case which generated four separate concurring or
dissenting opinions, embraced strict scrutiny without reservation,'
although he applied intermediate scrutiny to the facts of the case. 3 In
making his about-face, Kennedy not only failed to mention his attack in
Simon & Schuster, he made it appear that his staunch support for strict
Noting that the Court's "precedents...
scrutiny had been unflinching.'
apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress ... speech
because of its content,"'0 ° Kennedy cited three sources: Perry Education
Ass 'n v. PerryLocal Educators'Ass'n, ° 6 the majority opinion in Simon &
scrutiny by citing Carey, an equal protection case. Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,45 (1983); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)
(holding that statute prohibiting all picketing except labor picketing violated Equal Protection
Clause) ("Thus was a principle of equal protection transformed into one about the government's power to regulate the content of speech in a public forum, and from this to a more
general First Amendment statement about the government's power to regulate the content of
speech.").
95. Id. at 124-28.
96. Id. at 128.
97. 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (upholding restrictions on free speech near polling places).
98. Burson, 504 U.S. at 211-12 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 213.
100. Id.
101. 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (plurality opinion) (upholding regulation that cable television
systems carry broadcast stations).
102. Id. at 642-43.
103. Id. at 662.
104. See id. at 642.
105. Id.
106. Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). Perry seems a rather
inappropriate choice here, because although Perrylaid out the criteria for applying strict
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Schuster,"7 and, incredibly, his own concurrence in that judgment.'
As if to erase any doubt about his support of strict scrutiny, Kennedy added,
"Laws that compel speakers to utter or distribute speech bearing a particular
message [viewpoint] are subject to the same rigorous scrutiny."' 0 9
Just one year later, Kennedy authored Rosenbergerwithout making any
mention of a scrutiny standard. Perhaps Rosenberger demonstrates that
Turner Broadcasting - a case in which the Court was so fractured that
Kennedy could not garner enough votes for a majority - was merely an
aberration in a march away from strict scrutiny that Kennedy began in
Simon & Schuster. Nevertheless, it is troubling when a Supreme Court
Justice appears to change his mind about First Amendment scrutiny every
couple of years. Worse yet, when he does so without any explicit acknowledgement of that fact, confusion becomes the rule rather than the exception.
Rosenbergermay sound a death knell for First Amendment strict scrutiny," but the close vote in the case reduces the weight of such speculation. Perhaps strict scrutiny will bump along, trundled out on rare occasions
by a Justice acting out of either nostalgia or desperation."' Maybe, even
though never explicitly abandoned, it will die from neglect. It seems just
as possible that strict scrutiny has a long and colorful life ahead." 2
Rosenbergerprovides no definitive answers.

scrutiny, it applied rational basis review, rather than strict scrutiny, to the facts in that case.
Perry, 460 U.S.- at 48-55.
107. 114 S.Ct. at 2459 (citing Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 118-20).
108. Id. (citing Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 125-26).
109. Turner, 512 U.S. at 642.
110. For example, Rosenberger,along with Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd.v.

Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995), decided on the same day, may mark the final demise of the
Lemon test as an Establishment Clause tool. See Linda Greenhouse, Church-State Ties:
Court Rules UniversityMust Help Subsidize ReligiousJournal,N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1995,

at A 1,A 14 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (noting that Lemon has received
"an unattended burial")). Similarly, CapitolSquare Reviewmay spell the beginning of the
end of Justice O'Connor's endorsement test for deciding Establishment Clause cases. Id.; see
CapitolSquare Review & Advisory Bd., 115 S. Ct. at 2447-50.

111. As Justice Scalia said recently regarding the Lemon test, it is "[I]ike some ghoul
in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after
being repeatedly killed and buried." Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
112. See Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 680-81 (1996)
(relying on Rosenbergerin a content discrimination case and employing strict scrutiny);
Church on the Rock v. City of Albuquerque, 84 F.3d 1273, 1278 (10th Cir. 1996); discussed
infra text accompanying notes 184-201, 209-213.
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D. LIMITED PUBLIC FORUMS

Smith v. Regents of the University of California..3 is the only appellate-level case which has struck down as unconstitutional a mandatory
student activity fee used to fund a number of ideological student groups." 4
In reaching its holding, the California Supreme Court ruled that such a
funding system was not a limited public forum." 5 I have previously
speculated that if the Smith court had reached a different conclusion
regarding limited public forum status, the case might have had a different
outcome." 6 The Rosenberger Court's ruling concerning limited public
forums will undoubtedly affect the weight other courts attach to the Smith
decision.
In Rosenberger, Kennedy held that the Student Activities Fund was a
limited public forum."' Without acknowledging that he was changing the
rules, however, he effectively extracted the teeth from the existing restrictions on government action in a limited public forum,"' and, as discussed
below, substituted the dentures of judicial discretion in their place. In order
to understand the ramifications of this substitution, it is necessary to review
the Supreme Court's short history of limited public forum jurisprudence.
Professor Robert Post described it as the "sad and fascinating story" of a
concept that "was doomed from the start."" 9
1. The Origin of the Species
With the implication that it was simply a temporary public forum, the
term "limited public forum" first appeared in Supreme Court jurisprudence
in 1981, in an opinion by Justice White in Heffron v. InternationalSociety
for Krishna Consciousness,Inc.' 0 Up to and including Rosenberger, this
113. 844 P.2d 500, 511-12 (Cal.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 863 (1993).

114. Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060 (3d Cir. 1985) (striking down a mandatory
student fee used to fund a single ideological group, New Jersey Public Interest Research
Group).
115. Smith, 844 P.2d at 509 n.8, 511 n.10; see Waring, supra note 74, at 594-95.
116. Waring, supra note 74, at 622-23. Viewed another way, if the court had desired
a different outcome, it might have reached the opposite conclusion regarding public forum

status.

117. Rosenberger,115 S.Ct. at 2516-17. This ruling was not disputed by the dissent.

118. See id.
119. Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory
of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1745-56 (1987); see also David S. Day, The
End of the Public Forum Doctrine,78 IOWA L. REV. 143 (1992).

120. 452 U.S. 640, 655 (1981) (upholding state fair regulation banning distribution of
merchandise or literature except from pre-assigned booths). This term has unacknowledged
antecedents in the lower courts. In 1976, then Chief Judge Raymond Pettine defined and
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term, or the alternative usage "designated public forum," appeared in only
ten Supreme Court cases.'

Later in 1981, Widmar v. Vincent.. clarified that a limited public

forum is created by state action, 2 ' rather than existing "time out of mind"
as does a traditional public forum.' 24 The Court ruled that the limited
public forum requires the same limitations on government regulation as a
traditional public forum.' 25 Thus, in its effort to limit religious speech in
either forum, the government has "to satisfy the standard of review appropriate to content-based exclusions. It must show that its regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn
The Court also cited two recent cases that
to achieve that end."''

contained direct antecedents of the limited public forum concept.' 27

In 1983, Perry Education Ass 'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass 'n'2 '
noted that the state need not maintain a limited public forum indefinitely,
applied the concept of the "limited public forum" to the Rhode Island Old State House. See
Toward a Gayer Bicentennial Comm. v. Rhode Island Bicentennial Found., 417 F. Supp. 632,
638-40, enforced, 417 F. Supp. 642, 644-45 (D.R.I. 1976); see also Henrico Prof'I
Firefighters Ass'n, Local 1568 v. Board of Supervisors, 649 F.2d 237, 246 n.13 (4th Cir.
1981) (preceding Heffron by one month); International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness v.
Schrader, 461 F. Supp. 714, 718 n.4 (N.D. Tex. 1978). Distinguishing the forum at issue
from the public street that was the subject of PoliceDep't v. Mosley,408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972),
Judge Pettine ruled that the state could exercise content control in a limited public forum.
Toward a GayerBicentennialComm., 417 F. Supp. at 639 n.9. He also speculated that the
right merely to endorsementby the Bicentennial Foundation "could be considered a type of
public forum." Id. at 640 n.10.
121. Search of Westlaw, SCT Database (April 9, 1997). In three of these cases, the
term limited or designated public forum is mentioned only in passing and without definition
or application to the Court's reasoning. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v.
Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440, 2450 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392 (1993); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 427 (1992)
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
122. 454 U.S. 263 (1981); discussed supra text accompanying notes 45-48.
123. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 (noting state policy of accommodating the meetings of
student groups). As in Heffron, the Court used the phrase "limited public forum" only once
in the opinion. Id. at 272.
124. Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). A public forum
is any traditional public place where citizens' exercise of free speech rights fosters the ideals
of participatory democracy. Id.; Waring, supra note 74, at 544-47, 554-57.
125. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267-70.
126. Id. at 270.
127. Id. at 268 (citing City of Madison, Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 & n.8 (1976) (holding school board meeting to
be a public forum); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555-59 (1975)
(holding municipal theater to be a public forum)).
128. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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but "as long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a
traditional public forum.' ' 2 9 The Court for the first time delineated, in
side-by-side fashion, the characteristics and rules of the three forum types:
public, limited public and nonpublic. 30 However, the analysis included
a footnote regarding content discrimination which would ultimately prove
to be the Achilles heel of the limited public forum doctrine. The Court said
that the state may create a public forum "for a limited purpose such as use
by certain groups, or for the discussion of certain subjects.'' 3 According
to Robert Post, this left the government "free to build discriminatory criteria
of access into the very definition" of any limited public forum it chose to
create, and "therefore, it made no difference to the outcome of the case
' 31 2
whether the [forum was] categorized as a limited or nonpublic forum."
2. An Evolutionary Dead End
Then in 1985, Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational
Fund,Inc.'33 delivered a "coup de grace" that all but destroyed the limited
public forum as a meaningful jurisprudential instrument.'34 As Justice
Blackmun explained in his dissent, the majority allowed the government's
intent in establishing a forum to significantly influence the determination of
the forum's First Amendment status, at the expense of judicial evaluation of
m 35
'
the actual nature of the forum and activities therein:
The Court's analysis empties the limited-public-forum
concept of meaning and collapses the three categories of
public forum, limited public forum, and nonpublic forum
into two. The Court makes it virtually impossible to
129. Id. at 46 (citing Widmar,.454 U.S. at 269-70) (holding that teachers' mailboxes in
a public school were a non-public forum). Arguably, Perry'sstatements regarding the
restrictions imposed by limited public forums were dicta. Cf supra note 106.
130. Perry,460 U.S. at 45-46.
131. Id. at 46 n.7 (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 263 (student groups); Madison Joint Sch.
Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (school board
business)). Soon after, one circuit court went so far as to create two kinds of limited public
forums: "a public forum 'by designation' if the school opens the system for use by the
public ... [and] a limited public forum by designation if the school opens it for use by
certain groups or for the discussion of certain subjects." Ysleta Fed'n of Teachers v. Ysleta
Indep. Sch. Dist., 720 F.2d 1429, 1432 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding denial of use of internal
school mail system unconstitutional) (citing PerryEduc. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7).
132. Post, supra note 119, at 1754.
133. 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (4-3 decision); see supra note 86.
134. Post, supra note 119, at 1756.
135. See Cornelius,473 U.S. at 819-21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Day, supra
note 119, at 187-88; Post, supra note 119, at 1756-57.
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prove that a forum restricted to a particular class of

speakers is a limited public forum. If the Government

does not create a limited public forum unless it intends to
provide an "open forum" for expressive activity, and if
the exclusion of some speakers is evidence that the

Government did not intend to create such a forum, no
speaker challenging denial of access will ever be able to

prove that the forum is a limited public forum. The very

fact that the Government denied access to the speaker

indicates that the Government did not intend to provide an
open forum for expressive activity, and under the Court's
analysis that fact alone would demonstrate that the forum

is not a limited public forum. 36

In United States v. Kokinda,'37 Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion

concurring in the judgment which echoed Justice Blackmun's criticism of

the rationale used in Cornelius: "If our public forum jurisprudence is to

retain vitality, we must recognize that certain objective [rather than merely
intended] characteristics of Government property and its customary use by
38
the public may control the case.'

Kennedy expanded on this view in an opinion concurring in the judgment in International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee
("ISKCON"). 39 Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in the case
recited the Widmar-Perrymantra that regulation of a limited public forum

is "subject to the same limitations as that governing a traditional public
forum." ° Kennedy responded, in a prophetic double-entendre, that the
requirements for finding that a limited public forum exists "are so stringent

136. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 825 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
137. 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (plurality opinion) (using Corneliusrationale to hold that sidewalk between parking lot and front door of post office was a nonpublic forum).
138. Kokinda, at 737-38 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding sidewalk to be a public
forum) (citing Cornelius,473 U.S. at 819-20 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
139. 505 U.S. 672, 693-709 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) [hereinafter
ISKCON]. ISKCON's three separate citations reflected a badly fractured court. The majority
opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist held that a public airport was a nonpublic forum
and upheld a government ban on solicitation therein. ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 680-817 (6-3 decision). Lee v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 830 (1992), was
a per curiam opinion issued by a five-Justice majority created by the swing votes of Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy. There, the Court struck down a ban on distribution of free literature.
Id.
140. ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 678 (citing PerryEduc. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46).
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that I cannot be certain whether the category has any content left at all.' 4'
Kennedy believes the majority's limited public forum analysis "leaves the
government with almost unlimited authority to restrict speech on its
property ... turns on the govemproperty" because "classification of'' the
4
1 1
decision.
or
definition
ment's own
In Kennedy's view, "the so-called designated forum provides little, if
any, additional protection for speech.' 43 Protection is reduced in part by
the fact that limited public forum determination typically involves "case-bycase balancing," which inherently provides "little guidance to the State
regarding its discretion to regulate speech.' 44 To solve these inadequacies, Kennedy proposed broadening the definition of the traditional public
forum to reflect the modem realities of "fast-changing technology and
increasing insularity."' 4 5 Government property on which diverse public
speech occurs should be eligible for public forum status based on "the
objective, physical characteristics of the property" and its "actual public
access and uses" regardless of the property's "ancient or contemporary
origins and whether or not [it] fit[s] within a narrow historic tradition.' 46 .
government
In a "protected" public forum, unlike a limited public forum,
47
1
fiat.
by
speech"
over
control
broad
"assert
simply
cannot

141. ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 697 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added).
The portion of Kennedy's opinion discussed in this Article, which asserted that the airport
was a public forum, was joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens and Souter. ISKCON, 505

U.S. at 709 (Souter. J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part)

142. ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 695 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). Kennedy

complained that the Court had reintroduced into "First Amendment law a strict doctrinal line
between the proprietary and regulatory functions of government which [he] thought had been

abandoned long ago." Id. (citing Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897); Hague v.
Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)); see also Post, supra note 119, at
1722-52 (discussing the Davis rationale as a syllogism and tracing modern public forum
doctrine to Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972)).
143. ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 699 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).

144. Id. For more on the Court's debate over categorization versus balancing tests, see

infra part II.E.
145. ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 697 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).

146. Id. at 698. "The possibility of some theoretical inconsistency between expressive
activities and the property's uses should-not bar a finding of a public forum, if those inconsistencies can be avoided through simple and permitted regulations." Id. at 699.

147. Id. at 700. Government's only avenue to change the status of a public forum is
to "alter the objective physical character or uses of the property, and bear the attendant
costs." Id.
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Perhaps leery of the divisiveness of public forum doctrine evidenced
in ISKCON,48 the Court chose to avoid it altogether the next time it was
presented with a limited public forum case. In Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free School District,1 49 a unanimous Court found that the
existence of viewpoint discrimination"0 made it unnecessary to rule on the

Second Circuit's determination that the school auditorium at issue was

"neither a traditional nor a designated public forum," but rather, "a limited

public forum open only for designated purposes.

'

3. Kennedy's Resurrection
In Rosenberger,the fact that the Student Activities Fund ("SAF") was

"a forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense"' 52
precluded Kennedy from finding it to be a traditional public forum.

Kennedy could have agreed with the Fourth Circuit that the SAF was a
nonpublic forum,' or he might have refused to address the forum issue
altogether as the Court had done in Lamb's Chapel.54 It seemed unlikely
he would find the SAF to be a limited public forum, given the lack of
enthusiasm for limited public forums he stated in ISKCON. Moreover, using

the model of Lamb's Chapel, Kennedy's strongly stated conclusion that the
University of Virginia's actions were viewpoint discrimination amply
supported his ultimate holding in Rosenberger,'

without any assistance

148. Prior to ISKCON, the Court had clashed over whether to extend the Widmar
limited public forum concept to public high schools. CompareBoard of Educ. v. Mergens,
496 U.S. 226, 242 (1990) (plurality rejecting extension) with Mergens,496 U.S. at 271-72
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing for extension).
149. 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (invalidating, without applying forum doctrine, a public
school rule denying access to auditorium by religious groups).
150. Id. at 392-96.
151. Id. at 390 (citing Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959
F.2d 381, 386 (2d. Cir. 1992), rev'd, 508 U.S. 384 (1993)). The Second Circuit had held
that "the first amendment protections provided to traditional public forums only apply to
entities of a character similar to those the government admits to the [limited public] forum,"
adding that the "limited public forum... [can] remain non-public except as to specified
uses." Lamb's Chapel, 959 F.2d at 386. This holding was one of many that grew out of the
contradictory limited public forum definition offered in PerryEducation Ass 'n. See supra
notes 128-132 and accompanying text.
152. Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2517.
153. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 287 (4th Cir.
1994) (upholding the University of Virginia's right to withhold funding from WAP), revd,
115 S.Ct. 2510 (1995).
154. Indeed, regarding forum issues, Kennedy called Lamb 's Chapel the "most recent
and most apposite case." Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2517.
155. See supra part II.B.3.
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whatever from the limited public forum doctrine. Nevertheless, without
expressly acknowledging a lower court finding that a limited public forum
must occupy "physical space,"' 56 Kennedy overturned it and held that the
SAF was a limited public forum.' 57
Kennedy's novel approach in Rosenbergergave him an opportunity to
acknowledge the progressive decline of the limited public forum concept,
and at the same time to allow for its selective reincarnation in future cases
assisted by his expanded definition of viewpoint discrimination.
Although the Court had weakened the limited public forum considerably in
Cornelius, it had continued to maintain the legal fiction that restrictions
imposed by the limited public forum were on par with those governing the
traditional public forum - at least during the period from PerryEducation
Ass 'n to ISKCON. 58 In Rosenberger, Kennedy erased that fiction for the
first time. Citing Cornelius and Perry Education Ass'n, but without
admitting any misreading, he stated that in a limited public forum, the state
''may not exclude speech where its distinction is not 'reasonable in light of
the purpose served by the forum."" 5 9 However, the discussions in
Cornelius and PerryEducation Ass 'n, to which Kennedy referred, concern
the nonpublic forum. The full sentence in Cornelius from which Kennedy
extracted the rule reads: "Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be
based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions
drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are
viewpoint neutral."' 60
In concluding the paragraph in Rosenbergerwhich contained his limited
public forum definition, Kennedy made an unmistakable differentiation from
the rule governing the traditional public forum. "[C]ontent discrimination
... may be permissible if it preserves the purposes of [the] limited [public]

156. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 287.

157. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2516-17.
158. See supra notes 129, 140 and accompanying text.
159. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2517 (quoting Cornelius,473 U.S. at 806) (citing Perry

Educ. Ass 'n, 460 U.S. at 46, 49). Justice Souter agreed with Kennedy's misquote, although
Souter reached the same conclusion by misquoting Lamb's Chapel. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct.
at 2548 & n. 12 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Lamb's Chapel,508 U.S. at 388-90, 392-93).
160. Cornelius,473 U.S. at 806 (emphasis added) (citing PerryEduc. Ass'n, 460 U.S.
at 49).
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Rosenberger completes the process of merging the limited

public and nonpublic forum concepts begun in Cornelius.

In his dissent in Rosenberger, Justice Souter complained that Justice
Kennedy's "reformulation" of viewpoint discrimination would "significantly
'
expand access to limited-access forums." 162
While this prediction may have
been an exaggeration, it did allow Souter to make the astute observation that
Kennedy had not reconciled his expansion of the concept of viewpoint
discrimination with some of the Court's earlier public forum cases where this
distinction was crucial. 6 a In Rosenberger,Kennedy used one hand to close
off jurisprudential limitation of government content control of speech in
limited public forums, and with the other hand opened up the definition of

impermissible viewpoint discrimination to enable judges to sometimes include
within it certain content distinctions. In other words, government controls

content, but courts may decide that certain forms of content are, in fact,

viewpoint. Kennedy simply infected the limited public forum - and the
nonpublic forum, assuming that any real difference remains between the two

concepts - with a greater degree of judicial discretion.

There is a risk, however, that as doctrine is reformulated to incorporate
less exacting rules and produce less certain results, judicial reliance on
doctrine - as discussed infra Part II.E - appears less objective and all the
more self-serving. Justice Stevens, dissenting in Capitol Square Review &
Advisory Board v. Pinette, ' announced the same day as Rosenberger, said,

161. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2517 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46).
Although Kennedy does not suggest this, the reference to Perry is accurate only as an
extrapolation of Perry'sinfamous footnote seven, which appears on page 46. Seesupranotes
128-132 and accompanying text.
Kennedy's reformulation of the rules regarding content discrimination is all the more
remarkable in that it flatly contradicts his opening assertion in Rosenberger that "the
government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content." Rosenberger,115 S.
Ct. at 2516; see supra part II.B.
162. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2551 (Souter, J., dissenting); see supra part II.B.3.
163. Rosenberger,115 S.Ct. at 2551 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Cornelius,473 U.S.
at 812 ("[E]xclusion from fundraising drive of political activity or advocacy groups is facially
viewpoint neutral despite inclusion of charitable, health and welfare agencies."); PerryEduc.
Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 49-50 & n.9 (1983) ("[A]bility of teachers' bargaining representative to
use internal school mail system does not require that access be provided to 'any other
citizen's group or community organization with a message for school personnel."'); Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding regulation prohibiting political speeches on military
base); Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298,304 (1974) (plurality opinion) ("[E]xclusion
of political messages from forum permissible despite ability of nonpolitical speakers to use
the forum.")). The viewpoint discrimination holding in Corneliusis discussed supranote 86.
164. 115 S. Ct. 2440(1995) (plurality opinion) (upholding injunction ordering State of
Ohio to permit Ku Klux Klan to erect large cross on grounds of State Capitol). Thankfully,
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"[m]any (probably most) reasonable people do not know the difference
between a 'public forum,' a 'limited public forum,' and a 'non-public
forum.'165 If anything, Rosenberger is likely to increase that confusion
rather than lessen it.
E. A WOMAN SAYS "YES," BUT DOES SHE MEAN "NO"?
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's concurring opinion in Rosenberger
recites an old stereotype now regarded as offensive and harmful to women:
The need for careful judgment and fine distinctions
presents itself even in extreme cases. Everson v. Board of
Ed. of Ewing, 66 provided perhaps the strongest exposition of the no-funding principle: "No tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion."' 67 Yet the Court approved the use of public
funds, in a general program, to reimburse parents for their
children's bus fares to attend Catholic schools. 68 Although some would cynically dismiss the Court's disposition as inconsistent with its protestations ([see Justice
Jackson's dissent:] "the most fitting precedent is that of
Julia who, according to Byron's reports, 'whispering "I
will ne'er consent," - consented' ), 169 the decision
reflected the need to rely on careful judgment - not
simple categories - when two principles, of equal historical and jurisprudential pedigree, come into unavoidable
conflict. 70
O'Connor seemed to be saying that the Court, like a woman being
seduced, means one thing when it says another. Why would O'Connor
choose to employ such a sexist metaphor in a case that has nothing to do with
gender issues? The metaphor stood out all the more because none of her

the case did not involve a request to set the cross on fire. See generally R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
165. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2469 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166. Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2526 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing 330 U.S. 1
(1947)).
167. Id. (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 16).
168. Id. (citing Everson, 330 U.S. at 17-18).
169. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 19).
170. Id.
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male colleagues could have used it without subjecting themselves to charges

that they were reinforcing harmful stereotypes. Perhaps O'Connor was guilty

of no more than making an awkward response to an awkward situation.

Under this view, O'Connor's faux pas simply reflects the fact that she was

very troubled by this case,'' in part because she recognized that the hold-

ing was inconsistent with the sanctity of the Establishment Clause "nofunding principle."' 72
It appears that O'Connor's use of the Julia metaphor was part of a
pointed attack on the majority and dissenting opinions' over-reliance on
doctrine. O'Connor asserted that when "the principle of government
neutrality and the prohibition on state funding of religious activities ...
conflict, understandably neither can provide the definitive answer."' 73 In
other words, reliance solely on doctrine to provide a solution would make the
Court appear to be saying no and yes at the same time, and thus seem, like

poor Julia, to be illogical. For those of her colleagues who were not sufficiently intimidated by being compared to an indecisive young woman,
O'Connor phrased her criticism in scientific terms. "When bedrock

principles collide, they test the limits of categorical obstinacy and expose the

flaws and dangers of
a Grand Unified Theory that may turn out to be neither
' 74
grand nor unified."'

O'Connor also attempted to diffuse the doctrinal conflict in Rosenberger

through her response to the concluding arguments made by both sides.
Kennedy fired a shot with the infamous slippery slope argument, quoting
Widmar v. Vincent. 75 Not to be outdone, Souter unholstered a slippery slope

171. See Greenhouse, supra note 110, at Al.
172. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2526 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see id. at 2525-28.
173. Id. at 2525.
174. Id. at 2528.
175. 454 U.S. 263 (1981), discussed supra text accompanying notes 45-48. Widmar
was perhaps the closest antecedent to the facts of Rosenberger,evidenced in part by the more
than twenty-five times it was mentioned in Rosenberger.
"[T]he dissent fails to establish that the distinction [between 'religious'
speech and speech 'about' religion] has intelligible content. There is no
indication when 'singing hymns, reading scripture, and teaching biblical
principles' cease to be 'singing, teaching, and reading'-all apparently
forms of 'speech,' despite their religious subject matter-and become
unprotected 'worship.' . . . [E]ven if the distinction drew an arguably
principled line, it is highly doubtful that it would lie within the judicial
competence to administer. Merely to draw the distinction would require the
university-and ultimately the courts-to inquire into the significance of
words and practices to different religious faiths, and in varying circumstances by the same faith. Such inquiries would tend inevitably to entangle
the State with religion in a manner forbidden by our cases."
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quotation of Chief Justice Burger in Lemon v. Kurtzman."6 O'Connor
responded by asserting that the existence of a legal slippery slope is no
excuse for failing to draw a line somewhere. Citing an opinion by Kennedy
in a recent Establishment Clause case, she said, "judgment requires courts to
draw lines, sometimes quite fine, based on the particular facts of each
case."' 7 7 To reinforce her point she relied on a larger gun than either the
majority or dissent, a quotation of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: "Neither
are we troubled by the question where to draw the line. That is the question
in pretty much everything worth arguing in the law."' 78
Justice O'Connor's concurrence questioned her colleagues' use of
doctrine. Some have argued that doctrinal tests are often outcome-determinative, namely that the choice of a test determines the result and is thus a
circular, self-serving exercise.' 79 Put another way, those who define the
terms of the debate win.'8 Others have complained that jurisprudential
doctrine can obscure a case's important political and social implications.'
Serious debate about the merits of jurisprudential doctrine notwithstanding,

Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2524 (alterations in original) (quoting Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269270 n.6 (citations omitted)).
176. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). "[I]n constitutional adjudication some steps, which when
taken were thought to approach 'the verge,' have become the platform for yet further steps.
A certain momentum develops in constitutional theory and it can be a 'downhill thrust' easily
set in motion but difficult to retard or stop." Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2551 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 624). Given that
Rosenbergermay mark the end of the Lemon test, see supra note I10, Souter's choice to
close his dissent in Rosenberger with a quote from Lemon seems likely to have been
intentionally ironic. Rosenberger'sonly other citation to Lemon was also by Souter. See
Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2542 n.8 (Souter, J., dissenting).
177. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2526 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992)).
178. Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 168 (1925)).
Professor Pnina Lahav offers a contrasting view of Holmes' legacy, arguing that
invocation of the principles of state neutrality and the slippery slope reflects a Holmesian
pessimism about the ability of the state to regulate free speech and at the same time protect
First Amendment values. Lahav asserts that rejection of slippery slope logic mirrors Justice
Brandeis' optimism about the capacity of government regulation to serve as positive force in
protecting First Amendment rights. See Pnina Lahav, Holmes andBrandeis: Libertarianand
RepublicanJusfificationsforFree Speech, 4 J.L. & POL. 451, 481-82 (1988).
179. See, e.g., Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173,
188-89 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (concurrence criticizing strict scrutiny).
180. See generallyGreg K. McCann et al., The Sound of No Students Clapping: What
Zen Can Offer Legal Education, 29 U.S.F. L. REv. 313, 323-28 (1995); Williamson B.C.
Chang, Zen, Law and Language: Of Power and Paradigms,16 N.M. L. REv. 543 (1986).
181. See, e.g., Post, supra.note 119, at 1716 n.7; Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral
Restrictions,54 U. CHi. L. REV. 46, 93 (1987).
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arguing against the use of doctrinal rules is also a tactic to disarm 8opponents
2
when the applicable doctrine does not provide the desired result.1
In the end, O'Connor's concurrence is a rejection of the reverseCartesian analysis criticized supra Part ll.A. She endorses Rosenberger's
conclusion, but is sorely troubled .by the twisted doctrine used to achieve
183

it.

mH.

ROSENBERGER's PROGENY

Numerous courts have cited Rosenberger in the two years since it
became the law of the land. Several circuit court cases illustrate how some
of the strands of Rosenberger'sFirst Amendment jurisprudence are playing
out.
In Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts," 4 the Ninth Circuit
upheld summary judgment in favor of artists who had alleged that NEA's
decency rules for fellowships were unconstitutionally vague and contentbased. ' The Finley court highlighted at least three of the smudge pots
feeding the post-Rosenbergerhaze. 8 6
The first smoke cloud was that the reference to the hyperbolic ban on
content discrimination, so feared in some of Justice Stevens' opinions,
appears to have been all the more encouraged by Rosenberger."7 Finley
began its content discrimination analysis, just as Rosenbergerhad, by quoting
Rosenberger's shrill admonition that "the government may not regulate
182. That O'Connor may have had a temporary tactical purpose for voicing her dislike
for doctrine in Rosenbergerwas suggested by the fact that she expressed a contrary view in
a case just a year earlier. She opined that in adjudicating challenges to content-based restrictions on speech, "fairly precise rules are better than more discretionary and more
subjective balancing tests." City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2048 (1994)

(O'Connor, J., concurring) (invalidating ordinance banning residential political signs).
183. More than one Justice on the present Court would resist any move away from the
use of doctrinal rules. For example, Justice Scalia once complained, "our decision today
places the granting or denial of protection within our own idiosyncratic discretion. In my
view, that threatens First Amendment rights infinitely more than the tax exemption at issue."
Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 238 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(majority striking down state sales tax exemption for magazines based on their content); see
also supra text accompanying note 144 (Kennedy in ISKCON).
184. 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996).
185. Id. at 672.
186. The Finleycourt'sinterpretations of free speech doctrine discussedhere came after

it noted that it already disposed of the case on the grounds that the decency rule was
unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 681. The court's discussionsof content discrimination, strict
scrutiny and forum doctrine, arguably dicta, were presented as an alternate ground for its
holding in response to arguments by the dissent. Id.
187. See supra part II.B.
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speech based on its substantive content."' 8 The Finley court, however,
failed to attribute this hyperbole to its original source: Justice Marshall, writing in Police Department v. Mosley.'89 Continuing on the path laid down
by Rosenberger,Finley then altered the framework of its extreme assertion
by observing that government can control the content of speech when it, or

its proxy, is the speaker. 9 0 The court held that the NEA grants at issue

funded private speech, rather than government speech.' 9' Thus, the NEA
decency funding rule was unconstitutional because the court found it to be
content-based, analogous to the religion rule in Rosenberger.92 The court
also found the funding rule was impermissible viewpoint discrimination,
again relying on the logic used in Rosenberger.93
The second cloud was that Finley ignored Rosenberger's omission of

the strict scrutiny standard.

4

In the same sentence citing Rosenberger for

the notion that content-based speech restrictions are presumptively unconstitutional,' 95 Finley also cited Texas v. Johnson96 for the rule that strict
scrutiny must be applied. 97 However, Finley paid only bare attention to
strict scrutiny, failing to conduct a structured analysis of the elements:
compelling government interest, narrow tailoring, or least restrictive
means.'
Finley further clouds the role of strict scrutiny in the postRosenberger era.
The third source of smoke was continuation of the uncertainty as to the
circumstances under which public forum doctrine should be injected into
cases arising after Rosenberger. Finley made a veiled recognition of the
Rosenberger Court's extension of the public forum concept to cover
"metaphysical" forums,' 99 such as the funding mechanism at the NEA,20 °

but appeared disinclined to apply forum doctrine to the facts before it. Finley
merely noted this extension in order to reinforce its use of Rosenberger's
requirement of government neutrality in funding where "government has
188.
note 40.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Finley, 100 F.3d at 681 (quoting 115 S.Ct. at 2516); see supratext accompanying
408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
Finley, 100 F.3d at 681.
Id. at 682.
Id. at 683 (citing Rosenberger,115 S. Ct. at 2519).
Id. (citing Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2517).
See supra part II.C.
Finley, 100 F.3d at 681 (citing 115 S. Ct. at 2516).

196. 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) (overturning flag burning conviction).

197. Finley, 100 F.3d at 681-82.

198. See supra note 84.
199. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2517.
200. Finley, 100 F.3d at 682 n.20.
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declared its
intention to 'encourage a diversity of views from private
20
speakers. "'9

1

Two of these smokey themes were also evident in Forbesv. Arkansas
Educational Television Comm'n.20 2 In that case, the Eighth Circuit
reviewed a district court judge's ruling that a televised debate for congressional candidates was a non-public forum, which resulted in a jury's finding
that the plaintiff's exclusion did not violate his First Amendment Rights.2 3
Relying on Rosenberger for the continued vitality of the limited public
forum concept where the state "encourages a diversity of views from private
speakers," the court held the debate was a limited public forum. °4 This
conclusion came without substantial analysis, with the court opining that
determination of forum type has "no bright line or objective test." 20 ' The
court simply concluded that the campaign debate was clearly intended by the
government to foster political expression, thereby elevating it above nonpublic forum status. 20' At least in this case, Rosenbergerhas helped foster
an environment where a court can apply forum doctrine using a test that is
not a great deal more rigorous than "I know it when I see it."
The court bypassed the issues of content or viewpoint discrimination
as grounds for a First Amendment violation and concluded that it is not for
the government to decide which candidates for public office are sufficiently
politically viable for the purposes of inclusion in a public debate. 20 7 The
court claimed to have subjected the government's assertions to elements of
strict scrutiny - compelling interest and narrow tailoring - but this claim
was a toss-off at the end of the discussion, with no more analysis than that
offered by the Finley court.208
Church on the Rock v. City of Albuquerque2°9 mirrored Rosenberger's
application of limited public forum status to a city senior center. 21" Here,
the Tenth Circuit held that the city's ban on religious instruction in the
senior center was impermissible viewpoint discrimination, following the

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
Inc., 473

Id. at 682 (quoting Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2519).
93 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 499-501.
Id. at 503 (quoting Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2519).
Id. at 504.
Id. (contrasting to forums in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund,
U.S. 788, 805 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.

37, 47 (1983)).

207. Id. at 504-05.

208. Id. at 505.
209. 84 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 360 (1996).
210. Id. at 1278.
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logic of Rosenberger."' Just as the Finley court did, the Church court
mixed references to Rosenberger, which ignored strict scrutiny, together
with its application of strict scrutiny. Most puzzling about this alchemy is
that the court trumpeted the notion of a super critical review standard
beyond strict scrutiny, relying on language in Rosenberger which held
viewpoint discrimination to be a more "egregious form of content discrimination."2 2 The court articulated no tests in its review beyond those normally employed in strict scrutiny,2" 3 which makes its new test appear to
be nothing but smoke.
In Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-MarionCounty Building Authoritj 2 4
("Grossbaum 1"), the first relevant federal appellate opinion to follow
Rosenberger, the Seventh Circuit flew around the hazy issues described
above. Grossbaum I reviewed a religious group's challenge to the
Authority's regulation banning the display of religious symbols in the
county's administration building, a non-public forum.2 1 Relying primarily
on the reasoning of Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District,2t 6 and reinforced by Rosenberger, the Grossbaum I court held
that the regulation was a ban on religious speech and therefore unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination." 7 The court may have followed the lead
of Rosenbergerin not mentioning strict scrutiny in its analysis, but did not
adopt Rosenberger's hyperbole regarding the prohibition on content
discrimination by government.218
In Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion County Building Authority2 9
("Grossbaum IF'), a second challenge by the religious group, the Seventh
Circuit wrestled with the constitutional significance of motive in analyzing
government speech restrictions.22 ° The court upheld the constitutionality
of a new Authority regulation banning all private displays from the lobby

211. Id. at 1279.
212. Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting 115 S. Ct. at 2516).
213. Id. at 1280.
214. 63 F.3d 581 (7th Cir. 1995) (reversing denial of preliminary injunction).
215. Id. at 583. The parties stipulated that the forum at issue was non-public. Id.
216. 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (invalidating a public school rule denying access to
auditorium by religious groups).
217. Grossbaum I, 63 F.3d at 589-92.

218. Id. at 590-91, 591 n. 11; see supra part ll.B.
219. 100 F.3d 1287 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding denial of preliminary injunction).
220. Id. at 1292-99.

1997)

REVELATIONS FROM ROSENBERGER

of the administration building, a non-public forum. 221 Rejecting the
plaintiff's arguments regarding the motive behind the enactment of the
regulation, the court held that motive was only relevant where content-based
regulations were at issue, rather than content-neutral regulations as in the
instant case.222 The court regarded content-based regulations as susceptible to motive analysis because such regulations could be hiding impermissible viewpoint discrimination, of which motive would be vital evidence.223
Such careful scrutiny in cases involving content discrimination was
warranted, the court said, because the line between content and viewpoint
discrimination is both elusive and inherently manipulable.224 To illustrate
this point, the court referred to the Rosenberger Court's struggle with
whether religious speech should be categorized as content or viewpoint
discrimination.225
IV. WRONG MADE RIGHT
226
In Smith v. Regents of the University of California,
a recent case

holding mandatory student fees to be unconstitutional, the California
Supreme Court ordered the University of California ("UC") into "the con227
tent-based discrimination business," as one university attorney put it.
Smith required the University to determine whether individual student
groups have a political or ideological purpose, and if so to declare such
groups to be ineligible for mandatory funding.228 As a result of Rosenberger's holding characterizing such content distinctions to be a form of

221. Id. The regulation at issue had been enacted in reaction to the holding in
Grossbaum. Id. at 1290-91. The parties had agreed that the forum at issue was non-public.
Id at 1297. Thus, the court limited the reach of its holding on motive to non-public forums.
Id. at n.ll.
222. Id. at 1299.
223. Id. at 1298.
224. Id.
225. Id. (quoting 115 S. Ct. at 2517-18).
226. 844 P.2d 500 (Cal.) (requiring public university to provide dissenting students with
"opt out" from mandatory student activity fee), cert denied, 510 U.S. 863 (1993).
227. Rex Bossert, UC Bows to High Court on Student Refund Policy, S.F. DAILY J.,
January 26, 1996, at I (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gary Morrison, University of
California Deputy General Counsel).
228. Smith, 844 P.2d at 513. Under Smith, UC could have established a voluntary
funding system for student organizations not eligible for mandatory funding, but chose not
to do so, leaving some ideological student organizations without any external sources of
funding. Telephone Interview with Karen Kenney, Director of Student Affairs, U.C.
Berkeley (May 16, 1994); see Waring, supra.note 74, at 625 n.554.
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viewpoint discrimination,229 UC concluded that this portion of Smith was
invalidated by Rosenberger. a° Thus, after Rosenberger, UC is no longer
determining, as a part of the funding process, whether individual student
groups have a political or ideological purpose.2"'
The portion of Smith that was unaffected by Rosenberger is the
requirement that UC students who ideologically object to the funding of
particular student groups be given an opportunity to opt out and receive a pro
rata refund of fees received by those groups.232 There were fears that the
availability of an opt out would cripple funded speech or create an administrative nightmare.233 Such concerns may still have symbolic importance,

but in reality there has not been much practical detriment. Refunds for the
234
entire UC system appear to have totaled just twelve dollars.

V. IMPLICATIONS FOR STUDENT FEES OPT-OUT CASES

As stated in the Introduction, Rosenbergerwas analyzed for its effect,
if any, on the constitutionality of using mandatory student activity fees to
fund forums for student speech at public universities. Although the
RosenbergerCourt refused to reach this question,235 it nonetheless ruled on

229. See supra part II.B.3.
230. Bossert, supra note 227, at 6.
231. UC Berkeley's policies regarding the student activities fund have always denied
funding to partisan political organizations, such as those directly affiliated with a political
party. The policies also bar funding of religious organizations, however, several student
groups with religious names are permitted funding because their activities primarily center
around cultural activities, rather than religious worship. Telephone Interview with Karen
Kenney, Director of Student Affairs, U.C. Berkeley (September 25, 1996).
232. Smith, 844 P.2d at 506; see Bossert, supra note 227, at 6.
233. Waring, supra note 74, at 625-26.
234. Bossert, supra note 227, at 6.
235. See Rosenberger,115 S. Ct. at 2522; Rosenberger,115 S. Ct. at 2527 (O'Connor,
J., concurring); Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2548 n. 12 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also infra
notes 261-62 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has previously foregone many
opportunities to address this question; see Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d I ll
(5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1087 (1993); Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 906 (1992); Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060 (3d Cir. 1985)
(striking down fee dedicated exclusively to one organization), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1065
(1986); Arrington v. Taylor, 380 F. Supp. 1348 (M.D.N.C. 1974), aff'dmem., 526 F.2d 587
(4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Veed v. Schwartzkopf, 353 F. Supp. 149
(D. Neb.), aff'd mem., 478 F.2d 1407 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974);
Smith, 844 P.2d 500 (Cal. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 863 (1993). Most courts, with the
notable exceptions of Smith and Galda, have upheld the assessment of mandatory student
activity fees. See generally Waring, supra note 74.
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a number of related issues that may affect the disposition of this question
should the Court directly address it in the future.
A. STUDENT FEES' STATUS AS A TAX

The Court split over the question of whether the student activities fees

at issue were a tax, with the majority finding the fees not to be a form of

taxation.2 36 Although the Court viewed the tax issue through the prism of the

Establishment Clause, its determination nonetheless has implications for

future compelled speech challenges.
In Smith, an essential part of the California Supreme Court's holding
was its finding that such fees were not a tax.237 In prior cases,238 courts
made this finding implicitly and thus presumed that expenditure of the funds

generated by these fees did not constitute state action. A no-tax finding was
a necessary prerequisite to allow these courts to apply the compelled speech
standard which evolved from mandatory union dues cases.239 Even though
the union dues cases - which struck down mandatory fees used to fund

ideological speech -

served as the benchmark for student fees cases, most

courts carved out an exception to compelled speech prohibitions in order to
permit funded student speech at public universities.2 4 ° Smith applied the
union dues standard without the university exception.2 4'
Recently, a contrary line of authority - holding student fees to be a tax
-

evolved in three federal court cases upholding the denial of funding to

specific student organizations.24 2 By essentially overturning this line of cases,

236. Compare Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2522 (holding fee is not a tax) with
Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2534, 2538 (Souter, J., dissenting) (asserting fee is a tax).
237. Smith, 844 P.2d at 506.
238. See supra note 235.
239. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991); Keller v. State Bar, 496
U.S. 1 (1990) (bar dues); Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292
(1986); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & Steamship Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984);
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). In these cases, the mandatory fees
assessed were legislatively authorized, but were not collected or disbursed by government.
In Rosenberger,Justice O'Connor's reasoning regarding the tax and opt-out issues
was backwards. She asserted that because the standard of the union dues cases gave the
student fees "an opt-out possibility not available to citizens generally," this distinguished the
student fees from a tax. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2527 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing
Abood, 431 U.S. at 259 n.13 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment)). However, a prerequisite
for applying the union dues standard is an initial finding that the fees at issue are not a tax.
240. See generally Waring, supra note 74.
241. Smith, 844 P.2d at 508, 511-12.
242. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 271, 283 (4th
Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995); Tipton v. University of Haw., 15 F.3d 922 (9th
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Rosenbergercleared paths for both the continued application of the union
dues cases standard to student fees cases and the Smith-inspired elimination
of the public university exception to that standard.
B. THIRD-PARTY VENDORS

Rosenbergerconcluded that the student activity fees were neither "a tax
levied for the direct support of a church" nor "a general tax designed to raise
revenue for the University."243 With regard to the former taxation category,
both Justices Kennedy and O'Connor relied heavily on the fact that
"disbursements from the fund go to private contractors" rather than directly
to religious or ideological organizations. 2 " Apparently, the majority was
impressed with the First Amendment insulation provided by such an
arrangement."" A public university seeking to avoid a Smith judgment
would be well-advised to structure its student activity funding system as did
the University of Virginia, making all payments to third-party vendors instead
of directly to student groups.
C. FUNDING VERSUS FACILITIES

Both the court of appeals in Rosenberger2" and the California
Supreme Court in Smith247 held that the Widmar2" requirement of equal
access to facilities did not apply to access to funding. However, the Supreme
Cir. 1994); Student Gov't Ass'n v. Board of Trustees, 868 F.2d 473, 478 (1st Cir. 1989).
These cases were not framed as challenges to the collection of the fees.
243. Rosenberger,115 S.Ct. at 2522. "The Student Activities Fund ...represents not
government resources,. . . but a fund that simply belongs to the students." Rosenberger,115
S. Ct. at 2528 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
244. Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2522; see id. at 2523-24; Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at
2527 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Court noted, although not very convincingly given its
lengthy discussion of Establishment Clause issues, "that the student publication [WAP] is not
a religious institution, at least in the usual sense of that term as used in our case law, and it
is not a religious organization as used in the University's own regulations." Rosenberger,
115 S.Ct. at 2524; see supra part II.B.3.
245. "By paying outside printers, [rather than simply providing access to printing
equipment,] the University in fact attains a further degree of separation from the student
publication, for it avoids the duties of supervision, escapes the costs of upkeep, repair, and
replacement attributable to student use, and has a clear record of costs." 115 S.Ct. at 2524.
This view appears to be in line with the current trend towards privatization of government
services. See, e.g., Michael Hinds, Cash-Strapped Cities Turn to Companies to Do What
Government Once Did, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1991, at Al.
246. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 286.
247. Smith, 844 P.2d at 511 n.10.
248. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265-68 (1981), discussed supra text
accompanying notes 45-48.
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Court in Rosenbergerconcluded that rights of access to funding and facilities
were indistinguishableand thus entitled to equivalent constitutional protection.249 The Court began by noting that at least some of the costs of
"upkeep, maintenance, and repair of the facilities" to which access was
sought in Widmar were paid for by student activity fees.Y ° The Court also
stressed that its analysis was influenced by the fact that the benefits of the
funding at issue in Rosenbergerflowed to student
organizations not directly,
251
but rather through third-party contractors.
It is clear that in future suits challenging mandatory student activity fees,
courts will have to consider an equal access analysis based on Widmar. It is
unclear how such an analysis will affect the outcome of these cases, in part
because nearly all previous suits challenging student activity fees concerned
public universities' direct payments to student organizations.2 2
D. LIMITED PUBLIC FORUM STATUS

In one of the few areas of the majority opinion not challenged by the
dissent, Rosenbergerheld that the University of Virginia's Student Activities
Fund was a limited public forum.253 Given Justice Kennedy's redefinition
of the limited public forum,254 it is unclear if that status confers any real
benefits upon funded student forums. Perhaps the limited public forum label
signals that funding student forums have significant constitutional importance. As Kennedy said, universities are "vital centers for the nation's
intellectual life,"255 and "student expression is an integral part of the
University's educational mission." '56 In the future, lower courts may be
required to continue to pay at least that threshold level of homage to the First
Amendment benefits of funded student forums.

249. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2519,2523-24. Justice Souter disagreed, noting, "There
is no traditional street corner printing provided by the government on equal terms to all
comers." Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2546 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
250. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2523.
251. Id. at 2523-24. "There is no difference in logic or principle, and no difference of

constitutional significance, between a school using its funds to operate a facility to which
students have access, and a school paying a third-party contractor to operate the facility on
its behalf." Id. at 2524; see supra part V.B.
252. See supra note 235.
253. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2516-17.
254. See supra Part II.D.
255. Id. at 2520.

256. Id. at 2522.
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E. PREDICTION

Keeping in mind my skepticism concerning the Court's decision-making
process, 2"' 1 cautiously voice a prediction about how the Court might judge
the constitutionality of using mandatory student activity fees to fund forums
for student speech at public universities. It bears remembering that every
compelled speech challenge to the collection of such fees that has reached the
appellate level of state or federal courts has been brought by conservative
students objecting to the funding of liberal student organizations.258 Given
the conservative leanings of the present Supreme Court, that litigation posture
would probably work to the advantage of a similarly situated future case
brought before the Court.
Granting of certiorari in such a case is also more likely now because
Rosenberger has changed the litigation landscape by injecting religious
organizations into the mix of those eligible for activity fee funding. Previous
challenges to thfe collection of mandatory student fees heard in state and
federal appellate courts have involved the funding of political rather than
religious organizations.259 Those four members of the Court, slightly left
of its present center and who dissented in Rosenberger, would likely view a
suit seeking to impose an opt-out provision in the collection of student
activity fees as an important opportunity to stem the Establishment Clause
erosion they believe was imposed by Rosenberger.
Recognizing the polarization of the present Court, many commentators
describe Justice O'Connor as having a pivotal role as a swing vote.26° In
Rosenberger,she made it clear that she regarded "the existence of... an optout possibility" for students dissenting from the use of activity fees as a
significant reason for her vote to require the funding of a student religious
organization.26 ' She opined that "a fee of this sort appears conducive to
granting individual students proportional refunds."262
Rosenbergerhas made it more likely that the United States Supreme
Court will finally resolve the question of whether public universities must
allow students who disagree with the funding of certain student organizations
257. See supra Part II.
258. See Waring, supra note 74; see also supra note 235.
259. See Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500, 533 (Cal.) (Arabian, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 863 (1993); see also supra note 235. Rosenberger and
Tipton v. University of Haw., 15 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 1994), challenged individualized denials

of funding, not the general assessment of the fees.
260. See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, The Pivotal Vote, BALT. SuN, Oct. 1, 1995, at IA.
261. Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2527 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
262. Id. at 2528.
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to have the opportunity to opt out of a pro rata share of activity fee payments.
Many commentators - including this one - have warned that an opt out
would threaten the valuable contribution to academic freedom and the
uninhibited exchange of ideas made by funded forums for student speech at
public universities.2 63 Although the experiences of the University of
California suggest that only a handful of students would expend the effort to
opt out if provided with the opportunity,264 different results might occur at
other public universities if, for example, opt in procedures were to be
adopted. Students might be less willing to voluntarily support free speech if
their support required an affirmative check off on a registration form and
where failure to check a box would immediately reduce their tuition fees,
albeit by only a few dollars. There is risk that some public universities might
adopt this opt in method were courts to overturn mandatory activity fees.
Thus, Rosenberger, in spite of the good it has created at UC,2 65 should be
understood as having placed a storm cloud on the horizon for free speech and
academic freedom at public universities.
CONCLUSION

My criticism of Justice Kennedy here is primarily attributable to the
fortuity of his having written the majority opinion in Rosenberger. Other
Justices have engaged in similar jurisprudential wanderings, some with more
frequency than others. Yet, I have not meant to condemn all jurisprudential
wanderings. Creative deviations from precedent have been at the core of
some our justice system's finest moments, especially where the First
Amendment is concerned.2 66 That caveat aside, Rosenbergercan still safely
be described as creating more confusion than it resolved, especially regarding
viewpoint discrimination, strict scrutiny and limited public forums. As stated
in the beginning of this Article, Rosenbergerprovides no view from the top
of the mountain, only that of the mountain itself. Regrettably, the mountain
in this case appears to made of mud.

263. See Waring, supra note 74, at 615-30 and sources cited therein.
264. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
265. See supra part IV.
266. See, e.g., David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in the First
Amendment Tradition, 95 YALE L.J. 857 (1986) David Cole was the plaintiff's attorney in
Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996). See supra text
accompanying notes 184-201.

